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Spectral features of higher-order
side-channel countermeasures
V. Zaccaria, F. Melzani, G. Bertoni
F
Abstract
This brief deals with the problem of mathematically formalizing hardware circuits’ vulnerability to side-
channel attacks. We investigate whether spectral analysis is a useful analytical tool for this purpose by
building a mathematically sound theory of the vulnerability phenomenon. This research was originally
motivated by the need for deeper, more formal knowledge around vulnerable nonlinear circuits. However,
while building this new theoretical framework, we discovered that it can consistently integrate known results
about linear ones as well. Eventually, we found it adequate to formally model side-channel leakage in
several significant scenarios. In particular, we have been able to find the vulnerability perimeter of a known
cryptographic primitive (i.e., Keccak [1]) and thus tackle the analysis of vulnerability when signal glitches are
present. We believe the conceptual framework we propose will be useful for researchers and practitioners
in the field of applied cryptography and side-channel attacks.
1 INTRODUCTION
In modern days, designing a hardware cryptographic primitive requires a counter-
measure against side-channel attacks as well [2]. Nevertheless, a complete theory for
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reasoning formally about countermeasures continues to slip through the efforts of the
cryptographic research community.
In this brief, we present a mathematical formalization for reasoning symbolically
about such countermeasures. The main result of this work is the discovery of important
mathematical rules that connect a successful correlation power attack to the Fourier
expansion of the leakage under scrutiny. Originally, we started this research effort
to extend some recent results [3] to cover a broader range of countermeasures (such
as Boolean masking and threshold implementations). Eventually, however, we discovered
an elegant yet effective way to analyze any countermeasure from the vulnerability
standpoint. We admit that this is a significant claim that we hope to substantiate in
the following pages. To frame this work in the current research context, we note that
today there are mainly two “schools of thought” that address the same problem. On one
side, some approaches try to decide whether a circuit is vulnerable through formal or
static-type checking [4]–[6]. On the other side, a designer rushing to release its primitive
to production (s)he is more prone to detect circuit’s vulnerability through a simulation-
based approach [7]. We believe these methods are very important during the mid to final
stages of the design to verify the original protection claims. However, when we need to
set those claims, we are at a loss in terms of mathematical tools to find them precisely.
Eventually, we typically resort to more pragmatic approaches that, although increasing
our confidence, might yield non-negligible overhead.
To address this issue, we start from classic results in the context of the analysis of
correlation-immune Boolean functions [8], [9] (Section 2) and introduce a few novel
theorems that precisely govern the correlation immunity when Boolean functions and
leakages are manipulated through classic functional algebra (Section 3). We then show
how to apply the introduced conceptual tools to confirm the protection claims of a well-
known threshold implementation of Keccak (see Section 4). Eventually, we show how
we can discover vulnerability even when glitches are present (Section 5) and we close
with what we think are the current limitations and future developments (Section 6).
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2 NOTATION AND SUPPORTING THEOREMS
In this section we introduce some basic facts about the Fourier expansion of Boolean and
pseudo-Boolean functions1.
Definition 1 (Fourier expansion of a pseudo-Boolean function). The Fourier expansion
of a function f : Fn2 → R is a pseudo-Boolean function
F [f ] ≡ fˆ(γ) = 2−n
∑
x∈Fn2
f(x)χγ(x)
where χγ(x) = (−1)γ·x is called Fourier character or parity function and forms an
orthonormal basis for the vector space for all functions f : Fn2 → R [10]. The spectral
coordinate γ ∈ Fn2 identifies a subset of the original n variables while fˆ(γ) represents,
informally, the contribution of the XOR of that subset on the overall function value.
Note that if f(x) = (−1)F (x) with F : Fn2 → F12 (i.e., a single output Boolean function),
the above expression is conventionally called the Walsh transform of F (x) (indicated with
W [F, γ]). Dually, f can be reconstructed from fˆ with the inverse Fourier expansion:
F−1[fˆ ] ≡ f(x) =
∑
γ∈Fn2
fˆ(γ)χγ(x) (1)
Example 1. Let us consider the function F : F22 → F12 defined as
F (x) = x0x1.
Its Walsh transform can be computed as:
W [F, γ] = 2−2
∑
x∈F22
(−1)x0x1(−1)γ0x0+γ1x1
= 2−2
∑
x∈F22
(−1)x0x1+γ0x0+γ1x1
= 2−2{1 + (−1)γ0 + (−1)γ1 − (−1)γ0+γ1}
Now, to compute the contribution on f of a specific subset S ⊆ {x0, x1}, it suffices to
evaluate W [F, γ] for γ = [γ0, γ1], where γi = 1 if xi ∈ S. For example, to compute the
1. In this manuscript, we will use the following naming convention: a pseudo-Boolean function is a function whose
type signature is Fn2 → R while a Boolean function is a function whose type signature is Fn2 → Fm2 for any n,m.
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contribution of {x0, x1} on f , we evaluate W [F, [1, 1]] = 2−2(1 − 1 − 1 − 1) = −1/2. We
can exploit this representation to derive other quantities associated with the degree of
dependence of the function on a specific variable, as the following definition shows.
Definition 2 (Covariance and correlation of pseudo-Boolean functions (see [10])). The
covariance between g : Fn2 → R and the character function of a Boolean variable χγi(x) =
(−1)xi is:
σgχγi =
∑
γ 6=0
gˆ(γ)χˆγi(γ) = gˆ(γi) (2)
Considering that for any character χγi it holds that σχγi = 1, then it follows that the
expected correlation is:
ρgχγi =
σgχγi
σgσχγi
=
gˆ(γi)
σg
(3)
The classic definition of correlation immunity builds above Eq. (3), i.e., a function g
is m-th order correlation-immune if and only if gˆ(γi) = 0 for all γi ∈ Fn2 such that
1 ≤ wH(γi) ≤ m where wH is the number of bits of γi that are 1 (see [8], [9], [11]).
However, this is too general for our purpose, as we care only about those variables that
are sensitive2. Besides, we note that the concept of “order” that is conventionally used
in countermeasure theory is different from the one used for correlation immunity. If not
stated explicitly, when we refer to the protection order, we adhere to the conventional
meaning used for countermeasures which is the order of the statistical moments used to
mount the attack [12]. To be more precise, we will use this definition of vulnerability:
Definition 3 (m-th order vulnerability). Given a spectral coordinate γs that characterizes
only sensitive variables, we say that g : Fn2 → R is vulnerable at the m-th order in γs if
and only if F [gm](γs) 6= 0.
Theorem 1 (Spectrum of the Hamming weight). The Fourier expansion Hˆn of the Hamming
2. A side-channel might expose one or many intermediate Boolean values (visible variables) because they are
effectively processed by the hardware. We call sensitive variables the values that are deterministic functions of any
master key and public input. Visible variables are not always sensitive themselves because, in Boolean masking, those
are combined with random masks to produce visible variables [3].
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weight function Hn : Fn2 → R is
Hˆn(γ) =
n
2
δγ,0 +
∑
|γ′|=1
−1
2
δγ,γ′ (4)
where δ is the Kronecker delta function. The spectrum is thus 0-concentrated [10] on degree up
to 1 because for all degrees |γ|> 1 it holds that Hˆn(γ) = 0.
Proof. First, we observe that, given a Boolean variable xi, we can use the expression
(1− (−1)xi)/2 to compute its Hamming weight H1(xi). The following derivation is thus
possible
Hˆn(γ)
= F [Hn(x)] = F [
n∑
i=1
H1(xi)]
= F [n
2
−
∑n
i=1 (−1)xi
2
] = F [n
2
+
∑
|γ′|=1
−1
2
χγ′(x)]
=
n
2
F [1] +
∑
|γ′|=1
−1
2
F [χγ′(x)] = n
2
δγ,0 +
∑
|γ′|=1
−1
2
δγ,γ′
Remark 1. The above result can be extended easily to include the caseHαn (x) =
∑n
i=1 αiH1(xi)
(i.e., each bit has a different weight αi), however, for clarity of exposition, we will
concentrate on the former. The extension of the results of this paper to the latter case is
mechanical work.
3 A THEORY OF HIGHER ORDER VULNERABILITY
In this section, we set up a few novel mathematical tools which deal with how basic
operations of the algebra of (pseudo-)Boolean functions act on the Fourier spectrum,
i.e., composition and multiplication. The composition operation is useful to model the
power consumption of a digital circuit computing a Boolean function f whose power
model is expressed by a pseudo-Boolean function g:
Theorem 2 (Spectrum of the composition of a pseudo-Boolean function and a Boolean
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function). Given a function h : Fn2 → R such that
h = g ◦ f
where g : Fm2 → R and f : Fn2 → Fm2 , the Fourier expansion of h is related to g and f by the
following:
hˆ(γ) =
∑
γ′∈Fm2
gˆ(γ′)Pf (γ′, γ), γ ∈ Fn2 (5)
with
Pf (γ
′, γ) = 〈χγ′ ◦ f, χγ〉
where 〈·, ·〉 is the inner product of functions.
Proof.
hˆ(γ) = 2−n
∑
x∈Fn2
h(x)χγ(x)
= 2−n
∑
x∈Fn2
∑
γ′∈Fm2
gˆ(γ′)χγ′(f(x))χγ(x)
= 2−n
∑
γ′∈Fm2
gˆ(γ′)
∑
x∈Fn2
χγ′(f(x))χγ(x)
=
∑
γ′∈Fm2
gˆ(γ′)〈χγ′ ◦ f, χγ〉
=
∑
γ′∈Fm2
gˆ(γ′)Pf (γ′, γ)
From the previous theorem, we can derive two important corollaries.
Corollary 1 (Spectrum of the composition of a function and a linear, not necessarily
invertible transform). Let us assume that f : Fn2 → Fm2 is a linear transform:
f(x) = Kx
where K is a Fm2 × Fn2 matrix. Then we have that
Pf (γ
′, γ) = δK>γ′,γ (6)
where δi,j is the Kronecker delta. It follows that for a function h = g ◦ f , the spectrum of
h is related to the spectrum of g through the following relation:
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hˆ(γ) =
∑
γ′∈Fm2 ,K>γ′=γ
gˆ(γ′) (7)
Proof: see supplemental material.
When f(x) = Mx and M is an invertible matrix, the following corollary holds:
Corollary 2 (Spectrum of the composition of a pseudo-Boolean function and an invertible
linear transform). Given two functions g : Fn2 → R and f : Fn2 → Fn2 where f(x) = Mx is
a linear, invertible transform, the spectrum hˆ of the function:
h = g ◦ f
is related to gˆ by the following formula3:
hˆ(γ) = gˆ(M−>γ). (8)
Proof. In this case, there is a bijective mapping between γ and γ′ so Eq. (6) becomes:
Pf (γ
′, γ) = δM−>γ,γ′ .
Consequently, Eq. (7) can be rewritten as hˆ(γ) = gˆ(M−>γ).
Example 2 (Countermeasure against first order attacks). We now present a small exam-
ple to show the usefulness of Corollary 2. Assume the following leakage corresponding
to:
L(x) = H2(Mx) + δ, M =
1 1
0 1
 , x =
S
T
 (9)
where S is a sensitive variable, T is a random mask and δ ∼ N (0, σ) random noise.
We can derive the correlation with S following Eq. (3) and by considering its spectral
3. We use the operator −> to indicate the inverse of the transpose of the considered matrix.
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coordinate γs = (1, 0)
> consequently,
ρgχγs =
σgχγs
σg
[by Eq. (3)]
∝ Lˆ((1, 0)>) [by Eq. (2)]
= Hˆ(M−>(1, 0)>) [by Eq. (8)]
= Hˆ((1, 1)>)
= 0 [by Eq. (4)]
Another way to check for zero correlation is to expand the Hamming weight through Eq. (4)
into Eq. (9):
E [δ +H2(Mx )]
= E [H1(T )] + E [H1(S + T )]
= −
E
[
(−1)T
]
2
−
E
[
(−1)S+T
]
2
+ 1
Given that E[(−1)T ] = 0 for a random mask T , it follows that, for a deterministic value
S = s, the expected value of L(x) is 1.
We turn now to the case where we could have multiple leakage points in our circuit.
The following theorem allows us to compute the spectrum of a combining function
which is the product of two (or more) leakages:
T
S
x
⊕
M
H2 L = H2(Mx)
Figure 1. Circuit considered in example 2.
Theorem 3 (Spectrum of the product of two functions). Given two functions f : Fn2 → R,
g : Fn2 → R, the Fourier expansion of their product is proportional to the convolution of their
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transforms:
F [f ∗ g] = 2n(fˆ ? gˆ)
Proof.
F [f ∗ g] = F [
∑
γ1∈Fn2
fˆ(γ1)χγ1(x)
∑
γ2∈Fn2
gˆ(γ2)χγ2(x)]
= F [
∑
γ1∈Fn2
fˆ(γ1)χγ1(x)
∑
k∈Fn2
gˆ(γ1 + k)χγ1+k(x)]
= F [
∑
k∈Fn2
∑
γ1∈Fn2
fˆ(γ1)gˆ(γ1 + k)χk(x)]
= F [2n
∑
k∈Fn2
(fˆ ? gˆ)(k)χk(x)]
= F [2nF−1[fˆ ? gˆ]]
= 2n(fˆ ? gˆ)
Remark 2. The convolution fˆ ?gˆ is a fundamental building block behind any CPA attack.
The product of two leakages f ∗ g is in fact correlated with the sensitive variable γs if
the covariance with character χγs is not 0, i.e., if its Fourier expansion is not null in γs
(see Eq. (2) and Definition 3):
F [f ∗ g](γs) = 2n(fˆ ? gˆ)(γs)
=
∑
γ1∈Fn2
fˆ(γ1)gˆ(γ1 + γs)
=
∑
a1,a2∈Fn2 ,a1+a2=γs
fˆ(a1)gˆ(a2)
6= 0
Considering a single leakage f , one could easily extend the above condition to the p-th
power of f , which is thus vulnerable when the following holds:
F [fp] = 2(p−1)n (fˆ ? fˆ . . . ? fˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
p times
(γs)
=
∑
a1+···+ap=γs
p∏
i=1
fˆ(ai)
6= 0
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This observation leads us to the following theorem which, rather unsurprisingly,
subsumes the XOR-condition introduced in [3] where M describes the matrix associated
with the visible variables.
Theorem 4 (Vulnerability conditions for a leakage that is the Hamming weight of a
linear combination of variables). The leakage L = H(Mx)+δ, where M is an n×n invertible
transform, is vulnerable at the p-th order if and only if there exists a set Γ satisfying:
Γ ⊂ Fn2 = {γi} ∧
|Γ|= p ∧
∀γi, |γi|= 1∧∑
i
M>γi = γs
(10)
where γs is the coordinate in the Fourier spectrum corresponding to the sensitive variable.
Proof. By Definition 3, we know that the following must hold:
F [Lp](γs) =
∑
a1+···+ap=γs
p∏
i=1
Lˆ(ai)
=
∑
γ1+···+γp=M−>γs
p∏
i=1
Hˆn(γi)
6= 0
Assuming that there are solutions to the condition expressed below the sum, we must
ensure that all the factors of the product are different from 0 and that products do not
cancel in the sum. Since Hˆn is 0-concentrated on degree up to 1 (see Eq. (4)), this is
possible only when |γi|∈ {0, 1}. In particular, if, for all γi, |γi|= 1 then products do not
cancel because they have all the same sign (this case is particularly important and is
captured by the following definition).
Definition 4 (Minimum vulnerability order). We say that p is the minimum vulnerabil-
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ity order if for any p¯ ≤ p equation Eq. (10) does not have solutions; for such a p, it holds4
that |γi|= 1,∀γi. It follows that, if there exists a minimum vulnerability order, it is such
that:
Hn(M
>γs) = p (11)
as the last condition in Eq. (10) implies. In the following part of the paper, we will always
deal, unless stated otherwise, with the minimum vulnerability order of a countermeasure.
Example 3. Let us consider again Example 2; The above Eq. (11) mandates that if there
is any vulnerability, the minimum vulnerability order p is such that:
p = H(
1 0
1 1
1
0
) = H(
1
1
) = 2
Indeed, the equation
γ1 + · · ·+ γp =
1 0
1 1
1
0
 =
1
1

has the following solutions for p = 2:
γ1 =
1
0
 , γ2 =
0
1

so we say that L is vulnerable at the second order. To verify this finding, we expand the
Hamming weight in the expression of L through Eq. (4):
E
[
(δ +H2(Mx))
2
]
= E
[
(H1(S + T ) +H1(T ) + δ)
2
]
= E
(1 + δ − (−1)S+T
2
− (−1)
T
2
)2
=
E
[
(−1)S
]
2
+ σ2 +
3
2
One could thus readily see that there is a term (−1)
S
2
that is directly correlated with
the sensitive variable. By solving for (−1)S and averaging over T , one could directly
derive an unbiased estimator for (−1)S :
C(L) = 2 ∗ L2 − 3− 2σ2 s.t. E[C(L)] = (−1)S (12)
4. In fact a p-order solution Γ with a |γi|= 0 does not actually increase the vulnerability order as the remaining γi
constitute a solution for order p− 1.
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3.1 Non-uniformity of distributions of masks/shares
Interestingly enough, the applicability of Theorem 3 extends to the problem of the non-
uniformity of random distributions of shares. As noted by previous authors [13]–[15], it
is an issue that might increase the vulnerability of an implementation. Let us reconsider
Example 2 where T now is a random variable in F12 with the following non-uniform
probability mass function (PMF)5:
piT (t) = δ>,tp1 + δ⊥,t(1− p1)
The joint probability distribution of x = (S, T ) is thus
pix(x) = pix([s, t]) = δS¯,spiT (t)
where S¯ is the deterministic but unknown sensitive value. Not surprisingly, pix is a
pseudo-Boolean function as well, thus we can compute the average of the leakage as:
Ex∼pix [L(x)] = E[pix(x)L(x)]
following some basic fact of the theory of Boolean functions [10]. This observation is
fundamental, because the pseudo-Boolean function pix arising from the non-uniformity
of T becomes, in fact, an additional leakage. More importantly, averaging L(x) in the non-
uniform scenario is similar to a bi-variate attack on the uniform scenario. In fact, we can
rewrite the above expression into6
E[pix(x)L(x)] = E[δS¯,SpiT (T )L(x)]
=
1
2
E[piT (T )L(x)]
=
1
2
E[(H(T )p1 + (1− p1)(1−H(T )))L(x)]
=
1
2
E[(H(T )(2p1 − 1) + 1− p1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∝H(T )
L(x)]
where one can observe that the leakage L(x) is multiplied by a quantity proportional to
H(T ). If we compute the spectral expansion of this product (in the spirit of Remark 2)
5. We use the Kronecker delta to represent the probability density of each of the elements of the domain of the
random variable.
6. Basically, δ>,t becomes the Hamming weight H(T ) when included in the expectation computation, while δ⊥,t
becomes 1−H(T ).
December 6, 2017 DRAFT
PUBLISHED VERSION AVAILABLE ONLINE - DOI: HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1109/TC.2017.2772231 13
we can find that it is correlated with the sensitive variable, thus vulnerable, only when
p1 6= 1/2.
3.2 Extension to non-invertible transforms
In this section, we extend Theorem 4 to consider p different leakages of the form Li =
H ◦Qi (where Qi is not necessarily invertible) as the following corollary shows:
Theorem 5 (Vulnerability conditions for a set of (linear) leakages). The product of p leakages
L = [L1, . . . Li . . . Lp] of the form:
Li(x) = H(Qix),∀i
(where Qi is a linear non-invertible transform) is said p-vulnerable in γs if there exists a set Γ:
Γ ⊂ Fn2 = {γi}, |Γ|= p,
∑
i
γi = γs ∧
∀γi, γi 6= 0 ∧ ∃γ′ s.t. Q>i γ′ = γi ∧ |γ′|= 1
(13)
Proof. The proof of the above statement is implied by the conditions under which the
following Fourier expansion of the product is different from zero:
F [
∏
i
Li](γs) =
∑
γ1+···+γp=γs
p∏
i=1
Lˆ(γi)
=
∑
γ1+···+γp=γs
p∏
i=1
∑
γ′,K>γ′=γi
Hˆ(γ′)
6= 0
3.3 Extension to single output non-linear functions
Building up from the previous theorems, in this section we show how to detect the vul-
nerability for a general class of non-linear functions which, we believe, covers important
practical cases. In fact, we consider the following function composition:
h = g ◦ f (14)
where f : Fn2 → F12 and g : F12 → R. We will show that even this seemingly simple case
can be used effectively to model multivariate vulnerability.
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For now, let us reconsider Eq. 5; in particular we note that the function Pf (γ′, γ) =
〈χγ′ ◦ f, χγ〉 is formally equal to the Fourier expansion of:
Zfγ′(x) = χγ′(f(x)) (15)
we thus rewrite Eq. (5) as:
hˆ(γ) =
∑
γ′∈Fm2
gˆ(γ′)Zˆfγ′(γ), γ ∈ Fn2 . (16)
We now assume m = 1; in practice we focus on the case where f is a single output
function, so we can rewrite Eq. 16 as:
hˆ(γ) = gˆ(0)Zˆf0 (γ) + gˆ(1)Zˆ
f
1 (γ)
= 2−n
∑
x∈Fn2
gˆ(0)(−1)γx + gˆ(1)(−1)f(x)+γx
= gˆ(1)W [f, γ]
which indicates that the spectrum of the composition of two functions g : F12 → R
and f : Fn2 → F12 is the Walsh spectrum of f scaled by the Fourier coefficients of g. In
particular, if g = H1 then, as per Eq. 4, gˆ(1) = −1/2. We now exploit this finding to
extend Theorem 5 to the following:
Corollary 3. Given a set of leakages L = [L1, . . . Li . . . Lq], where
Li(x) = H1(fi(Qix)),∀i
where fi : Fn2 → F12 and Qi is a linear non-invertible transform, the product is vulnerable
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in γs if there exists a solution to7:
F [
p∏
i=1
Li]
∝
∑
a1+···+ap=γs
p∏
i=1
W [fi ◦Qi, ai]
=
∑
a1+···+ap=γs
p∏
i=1
∑
γij∈Fm2 ,Q>i γij=ai
W [fi, γij]
6=0
4 A PRACTICAL CASE STUDY: KECCAK
To show a practical application of the previous findings, let us now consider the architec-
ture of a countermeasure devised for the Keccak algorithm as presented by its inventors
[1]. We selected Keccak because it is a real-world standard (SHA-3) yet the core mapping
is a simple 3-to-1 bit non-linear function of degree two which makes it amenable to the
available space of this brief.
The considered version offers first order protection against SCA by using a Threshold
Implementation (TI) with three shares. The focus point of our analysis is the output of
each share; in fact we investigate whether there exists a leakage product configuration
that correlates with a sensitive variable. In particular, we are going to consider the
following leakages8:
Lc = H(χ3(a0, a1, a2, b1, b2)) + δ1 (17)
La = H(χ3(b0, b1, b2, c1, c2)) + δ2 (18)
Lb = H(χ3(c0, c1, c2, a1, a2)) + δ3 (19)
where a, b and c are understood as variables in F32. We also note that each χ3 can be
7. With a small abuse of notation, we useQi not only to indicate the matrix associated with the linear transformation
but also the transformation itself.
8. With respect to the original notation we omit the implicit index i and use just the offset to indicate the actual bit
of the share considered (e.g., ai+1 → a1).
December 6, 2017 DRAFT
PUBLISHED VERSION AVAILABLE ONLINE - DOI: HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1109/TC.2017.2772231 16
rewritten vectorially as:
χ3(v) = v0 + (v1 + 1)v2 + (v2v3) + (v1v4)
thus, defining an F92 vector of shares y = [a, b, c], each L∗ above can be rewritten in matrix
form as9
L∗ = H(χ3(R∗y)) (20)
where R∗ is a F5×92 matrix that selects the right bits for each leakage. While the latter
equation is similar to the one considered in Corollary 3, we still need to express the
shares in terms of the original vector x containing the sensitive variables. Here we follow
the share composition proposed in [1], where a and b are uniformly random variables
in F32, while c is derived from the sensitive variable s: c = a + b + s. We can express this
computation in matrix form if we define x = [s, a, b]T and thus rewrite y as
y = Mx, M =

I3 I3 I3
03 I3 03
03 03 I3
 (21)
where I3 is the F3×32 identity matrix and 03 is the F3×32 null matrix. Eq. 20 can be eventually
rewritten as
L∗ = H1(χ3(R∗Mx)) = H1(χ3(Q∗x)) (22)
where Q∗ = R∗M is thus a leakage specific matrix (see supplemental material for the
complete data on R∗ and Q∗). Eventually, after deriving the Walsh transform of χ3, we
check whether the condition dictated by Corollary 3 holds for any combination of the
three leakages. In theory, we can formulate the corollary as a predicate over (γs, p) and
solve it with an SMT solver (e.g., Z3 [16]). In practice, however, if one limits itself to three
variables and q ≤ 4, a full search works as well. Table 1 shows the only vulnerabilities
found for q ≤ 4 (as the reader can see, no vulnerabilities with less than 3 variables have
been found).
9. We use an asterisk (*) to mean either a, b or c.
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Table 1
Vulnerabilities and combination functions of Keccak TI / 3 shares
q type exposed variables combining function
3 tri-variate s0 La ∗ Lb ∗ Lc
3 tri-variate s0 + s1 La ∗ Lb ∗ Lc
3 tri-variate s0 + s2 La ∗ Lb ∗ Lc
3 tri-variate s0 + s1 + s2 La ∗ Lb ∗ Lc
5 GLITCH-INDUCED SIDE-CHANNEL LEAKAGE
In this section, we extend the proposed methods to detect vulnerability when a particular
kind of glitch is present, i.e., a glitch due to a non-instantaneous transition of the input
signals of the circuit, as the following definition shows:
Definition 5 (Functional glitch). A functional glitch of a pseudo-Boolean function f :
Fn2 → R over a time interval T is an unintended value f(xt), t ∈ (0, T ), x ∈ Fn2 where xt
is different from x0 and xT (i.e., the intended values of the function at the beginning or
the end of the time period).
This definition is useful to model the case where the arrival-times of the input signals
of the (synchronous) circuit are different, i.e., inputs might settle at different times within
the clock period. We also assume that the circuit’s output line is driving a high capacitance
wire or the input of a register, implying that the leakage (power consumption) of
intermediate nodes is negligible.10 In this context, we can model inputs through an
input transition vector:
Definition 6 (Input transition vector). An input transition vector of a Boolean function
f : Fn2 → R over a time interval [0, T ] is a vector that combines the function’s input value
at the beginning of the time interval (i.e., x0) and at the end of the same (xT ):
z = (x0, xT )
> z : F2n2
10. While we acknowledge that this not the most general model, we also point out that simultaneous arrival-times
are very difficult to achieve thus a leakage associated with this phenomenon will always be present.
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where x0, xT are variables in Fn2 . We also define some projection operators:
dze = x0, bzc = xT
d·e and b·c are called, respectively, the upper slice operator and the lower slice operator.
The concrete value of the input of the function at the beginning and end of the
interval can always be described using its input transition vector z. For example, the
following equivalences hold:
f(x0) = f(dze), f(xT ) = f(dPT ze)
where PT is a permutation that swaps x0  xT .
Assumption 1. We assume here that a 1 bit input signal x can change only once during
the time interval T . This allows us to model each intermediate value xt of the input
signal at time t as either x0 or xT . This allows us to represent xt as the concrete value of
a specific permutation Pt of z:
xt = dPtze. (23)
Note that this representation is not suitable when x changes multiple times. For example,
if x is meant to be constant across the time interval (x0 = xT ) but changes at xT
3
and xT
2
,
the latter two values are inexpressible in terms of Eq. (23).
Our approach considers a fixed set of permutations. While this might seem as a
limitation, we note that there are particular design phases (e.g, after physical layout)
were an estimate of the delays (and thus of signal switches) can be done. Otherwise,
if the number of signals is reasonably low, one could explore the space of possible
permutations to find a vulnerability.
Example 4. Let us consider a function f(q, s) : F22 → R with the corresponding input
transition vector:
z = (q0, s0, qT , sT )
>
and assume that the concrete input signal undergoes the following transitions:
(q0, s0)
> → (qT , s0)> → (qT , sT )>.
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It is evident that these signal values can be described just as permutations of the
transition vector:
dze → dPqze → dPsPqze
where Ps, Pq are, respectively, the permutation matrix exchanging s0 → sT and q0 → qT .
Note that a functional glitch is actually caused by the presence of concrete values (like
dPqze) which do not correspond to neither the initial nor the final value of the function’s
input.
5.1 Leakage modeling criteria
Previously, we have shown that a functional glitch of a function f at a certain time t can
be modeled as:
f(xt) = f(dPtze).
To check whether such leakage is vulnerable, we characterize the spectrum of the
composition of a normal function and an upper slice operator.
Theorem 6. Given a function f : Fn2 → R, the spectrum of a function h : F2n2 → R such that:
h(z) = f(dze)
is the following:
hˆ(γ) =
fˆ(dγe) for bγc = 00 otherwise (24)
where γ0 is the indicator associated with the subset of variables x0.
Proof: see supplemental material.
Assuming that the attacker can probe the leakage function f(xt) in each time slot
t, she will see samples whose convolution is potentially correlated with a sensitive
variable. The case when f is linear can be analyzed through Corollary 2 and Theorem 4.
This allows us to introduce the following theorem.
Theorem 7 (Vulnerability conditions for a leakage that is the Hamming weight of a linear
combination of variables which change value once within a given time period). Let us
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Table 2
Signal transitions considered in Example 5.
time slot 0 1 2 3
Pt I PS PTPS PUPTPS
L(z, t) f(s0, t0, u0) f(s1, t0, u0) f(s1, t1, u0) f(s1, t1, u1)
consider the following leakage function, parameterized by the time-slot t in which the measure
takes place:
L(z, t) = Hn(MdPtze)
where Pt is the permutation matrix describing the current state of the variables at time slot t (see
Assumption 1). We say that the leakage is minimally vulnerable at the p-th power if there exists
a set Γ and a corresponding choice of the time slots ti satisfying:
Γ = {γi} ∧
|Γ|= p ∧
∀γi, |M−>dγie|= 1 ∧ bγic = 0 ∧∑
i
P>ti γi = γs
(25)
where γs is the coordinate in the Fourier spectrum corresponding to the sensitive variable11.
Proof: see supplemental material.
Remark 3. There is a striking similarity between Theorem 7 and Theorem 4 which can
be justified by the fact that each permutation Pti is a special case of invertible linear
transform. In fact, the former can be considered an extension of the latter.
Note that the above theorem allows to detect a possible vulnerability that can be
associated with combinations of input signals at the beginning and the end of the
considered time period as the following example will show.
11. As usual, this holds when Hn is a weighted sum as well (see Remark 1).
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S
T
U
x
⊕ ⊕
M
H3 L = H3(Mx)
Figure 2. Circuit under scrutiny in Example 5
Example 5. Let us extend Example 2 to include a second order countermeasure and to
show how the glitch model applies to it. In practice, we add a second mask U to protect
the sensitive variable S (see Figure 2). For all the input variables we consider a single
transition over the time interval [0, 1] thus the actual input transition vector will be:
z = [s0, t0, u0, s1, t1, u1]
>.
The order of transitions can give rise to different propagation sequences; Table 2 just
describes one of them, i.e., the case where S changes at time-slot 1, followed by T and
U .
If we want, for example, to detect vulnerabilities at the second order in the first two
time slots, we check whether the combinatorial problem in Eq. (25) has any solution
(Γ, γs) with the following data:
p = 2, P0 = I, P1 =

0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,M−> =
(
1 0 0
1 1 0
1 0 1
)
where M and Pt are known from Table 2 and Figure 2. The solution(s) might be multiple;
among the interesting ones we find with brute force there is:
Γ = {[111000]T , [111000]T}, γs = [100100]T
where γs corresponds to the spectral coordinate of s0 + s1 which is thus vulnerable. It
can be shown (see supplemental material) that the average leakage conditioned to the
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sensitive variables is:
E
[
(L (z, 3) + L (z, 2) + L (z, 1) + L (z, 0) + δ)2
]
(26)
= σ2 +
E
[
(−1)s1+s0]
2
+
83
2
(27)
which indeed depends on the transition of the sensitive variable S over the time interval.
5.2 Functional glitches in a non-linear circuit
The above theory of functional glitches can be extended to non-linear circuits such as
those considered in Section 3.3. Let us consider a single non-linear function that emits a
leakage through H1:
L(z, t) = H1(f(dPtze)).
We can check whether this function is vulnerable to functional glitches by checking if
there is any set of spectral coordinates
γ1, . . . , γp
for which the following expansion is different from zero:
F [∏i L(z, ti))](γs)
=
∑
a1+···+ap=γs
∏p
i=1 Lˆti(ai)
=
∑
a1+···+ap=γs
∏p
i=1 Lˆ0(P
−>
ti ai) [by Cor. 2]
=
∑
P>t1γ1+···+P
>
tp
γp=γs
∏p
i=1 Lˆ0(γi) [by subst.]
∝∑P>t1γ1+···+P>tpγp=γs∏pi=1W [f, dγie] [by Th. 6]
∧ ∀γi, bγic = 0
6= 0
(28)
where Lˆ0 = F [L(z, 0)].
Example 6. To find a few more interesting vulnerabilities for the Keccak primitive
considered in Section 4, let us analyze leakage La (see Eq. (22)) when only s1 changes to
s′1 over an interval characterized by two time slots (t0 and t1). The input transition vector
is an 18-wide vector12, while Pt0 = I and Pt1 permutes s1 ↔ s′1. The question we want to
12. each leakage depends on 9 variables, the first 3 of which are the sensitive ones.
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answer is whether La’s value correlates with the change s1 → s′1, i.e., with
γs = [0
s1
10000000︸ ︷︷ ︸
dγse
0
s′1
10000000︸ ︷︷ ︸
bγsc
]>.
We know that the correlation with γs is not zero only if we find a pair of spectral
coordinates (γ1, γ2) for which Eq. (28) is satisfied13. On the one hand, the subscript of the
sum in Eq. (28) requires that any pair should satisfy:
γ1 + Pt1γ2 = γs (Pt0 = I in this example) (29)
which, substituting γs and after some simple algebraic manipulation, can be rewritten
as:
γ1 = γ2 ∧ bit(γ1, 1).
Both pair components should thus i) be equal and ii) have the second bit set (in the
following we will use the symbol γ to refer to the same value γ1 = γ2). On the other
hand, Eq. (28) is satisfied only if dγe belongs to the support ofW [χ3◦Qa] (see Corollary 3).
As can be seen in Table 3, there are candidates for γ belonging to such support (those
marked with the asterisk) which make Eq. (28) satisfiable, thus the considered leakage
correlates with a transition on the sensitive variable s1.
Table 3
Support of the Walsh transform of χ3 ◦Qa. Rows with an asterisk correspond to the values of γ that comply
with Eq. (29).
dγe W[χ3 ◦Qa] dγe W[χ3 ◦Qa]
00000100 1/4 00000101 1/4
00000110 1/4 00000111 1/4
00101100 1/4 00101101 1/4
00101110 -1/4 00101111 -1/4
01010100 -1/4 * 01010101 1/4 *
01010110 -1/4 * 01010111 1/4 *
01111100 1/4 * 01111101 -1/4 *
01111110 -1/4 * 01111111 1/4 *
13. We look only for two coordinates because we have two time slots, i.e., p = 2.
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Table 4
Vulnerabilities found for Keccak three shares. L∗ is the leakage measured at t0 while L′∗ is the one measured at t1.
Note that the sum of both leakages is just the energy consumed in the whole time interval.
p type exposed variables combining function
2 bi-variate s1 + s′1 (La + L′a)2
2 bi-variate s2 + s′2 (La + L′a)2
2 bi-variate s0 + s′0 (Lb + L′b)
2
2 bi-variate s1 + s′1 (Lb + L′b)
2
2 bi-variate s2 + s′2 (Lb + L′b)
2
Eventually, if we repeat the process for all the three shares, we find the vulnerabilities
expressed in Table 4 which are all at the second order (as the smallest p we’ve found is
2) and concern only La and Lb.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this brief, we have proposed a spectral model for reasoning symbolically about a
countermeasure against side-channel attacks. The proposed framework allows one to
detect, in a mathematically sound way, whether a general class of countermeasures
holds up to a specific protection order. The symbolic treatment allowed us to derive
precise combination functions useful for attacks, as well as confirm certain claims about
a threshold implementation of Keccak. In addition, we have shown that the framework
allows one to tackle the problem of glitch-based leakages, and we give some practical
applications for this case. Further development of this work might include extending it
to a broader set of nonlinear functions and to multiple changes of a signal during a time
interval.
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